I wouldn’t say that, but it’s honest. And I’ll read the write up and reserve judgement until I’m done or decide it’s not worth continuing. When AI writes the article and there’s a disclaimer, I won’t read it. Saw one the other day: I used ai to write this, if you have a problem with that, stop reading. Of course, I did stop reading (and flagged the post).
I never really loved how extensions have to put their interfaces in the website's DOM if they want to be able to work with the page's elements, like this selector, or a password manager's suggested logins. Especially in the password manager's scenario, it could leak what accounts you have to a given website to that website itself, if the page is looking for new DOM elements. Not exactly a showstopper vulnerability, but it's not a good thing.
Setting aside data leaks, this also causes bugs in extensions to potentially affect websites en masse. For instance, as recently as this January, 1Password began injecting prism.js globally on all pages, breaking many <code> blocks for at least 20 days: https://mjtsai.com/blog/2026/01/07/1password-browser-extensi...
Did XUL extensions in Firefox prior to WebExtensions have a different way of interacting with the page contents? I know they tended to integrate better with the host browser's UI and inherited more of the host OS's UI conventions as a result, but the web back then didn't require as many CSS-based ad blocking rules (domain/URL-based rules worked for almost everything) so I don't remember what the element picker UI was like on eg. AdBlock Plus or Adblock 0.5.
XUL extensions basically have full access to the entire browser's UI and internals, which allows for some very powerful extensions.
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
That doesn't really answer the question. Sure, XUL extensions have better access to the internals of the browser. But does that translate into XUL extensions being able to better isolate their own internals from being accessed by untrusted websites?
In the case of password managers, amy decent one will put their DOM elements in a closed shadowDOM root, which prevents the page scripts from interacting with it entirely.
I recommend to delete old forefox profiles and create new once, than install new fixed uBlock0. You should always use separate profiles for all tasks with hardened user.js anyway. Don’t forget to save your bookmarks. Anynew profile creates new UUID.
uBlock Origin has broad permission to inspect and modify anything on a page (it needs it, to do what it does). This would seem to make any vulnerability easier to exploit.
Haven't used any uBlock for many years. Use DNS based blocking.
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
DNS-based ad-blocking is very ineffective in the modern web browsing scenarios. You might block most ads from your local news site, although YouTube, Twitch, Facebook and any other major site has more sophisticated ad-networks which require ad-blocking at the browser level.
You've been required to use a browser based ad-blocked on YouTube for over 5 years now.
I have not used Facebook for many years. My Youtube usage is well less than an hour per month. Those are shitty businesses I don't want to waste my time with. Generally my Web usage is going down. I hate most of the internet these days.
> But the attacker website can itself hook the XHR made from inside the no-fetch-if hook to extract the random extension UUID.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
Chromium used static IDs for web accessible resources until very recently, and even now it's only optional for extensions to use dynamic IDs. This page enumerates extensions with non-dynamic URLs in Chromium: https://browserleaks.com/chrome
I understand why folks railed against web extension lock downs that blocked directly editing page content but this is a great example of why it’s a powder keg.
Wonder what the over-under is on a page exploiting your `block-element` interface if you happen to open it (I guess you could sort of encourage that interaction) vs explicitly getting served malware eg "Discover-Tech’s Controlium".
The concept of browser extensions seems terrible in general. There are many that ship with malware, botnets, infostealers etc. uBlock Origin even requires a compiled .wasm module. It's unwise to grant that level of complexity from third party devs permission over something as sensitive as your web browser.
Th day no browser allows it is the day I make the vibe-browser. A browser that scraps all the content of every website, and tells an AI to present it without the garbage.
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
Individual websites can't be granted permission over your entire browser, they operate in a sandbox (then again firefox for example has a relatively insecure sandbox).
If this sounds appealing to you, you may be happy to know that XUL lives on as Unified XUL Platform (UXP) and is still supported by currently maintained browsers.
UXP: https://repo.palemoon.org/MoonchildProductions/UXP
Pale Moon: https://www.palemoon.org/
Basilisk: https://www.basilisk-browser.org/faq.html
SeaMonkey: https://www.seamonkey-project.org/
uBlock Origin: 1.76.4
uBO Lite: 2026.1110.1816
For many years I was a happy user of CAD (Cookie Auto Delete). Unfortunately it seems unmaintained. I have now stopped to install it. Don't understand enough of modern browsers to even have an educated guess what kind of vulnerabilities could be buried in the old code.
You've been required to use a browser based ad-blocked on YouTube for over 5 years now.
Oh great. I recently learned[0] that some Firefox extensions can be tricked into leaking their install-unique UUID, which can then be used as a tracking identifier. Today I learn that any site can get my unique uBO UUID by hooking fetch('/adsbygoogle.js').
That is... an ironic disaster.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50454639
This extensions exist to solve a problem where the alternative will NOT involve playing nice about it.
mafia execution?